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Introduction 
 
The National Restaurant Association (NRA) describes restaurants as “cornerstones” of 
the U.S. economy and local communities. Currently, there are 945,000 restaurants nationwide 
and the industry is projected to generate $566 billion in annual sales with a total economic 
impact of more than $1.5 trillion (NRA, 2009). In 2008, the industry employed nearly 13 million 
workers, representing 9% of the U.S. workforce (Hensley & Donohue, 2008). This “cornerstone” 
industry, however, is not immune from the current economic recession and has been facing great 
challenges in recent years. The restaurant industry has traditionally been relying heavily on 
consumers’ discretionary spending (Gu, 2002). The current credit crisis and extended recession 
of the U.S. economy have forced many customers to cut back their spending on travel and 
hospitality consumptions. Consequently, restaurant sales have decreased nationwide and the 
average profit margin fell below 4% (Frumkin, 2009). According to Lockyer (2009), 2010 will 
be an even more difficult year for the industry. While the costs of food commodity is expected to 
rise and the operating environment will remain extremely competitive, consumer spending is 
likely to be weak and restaurant customers will have little tolerance for increased menu prices 
(Fitch Ratings, 2009).  
 
To make the situation even more challenging for restaurant firms, the proposed House 
Health Care Reform Bill (Frumkin, 2009) is projected to further increase the cost burden and has 
thus raised a hailstorm of public opinion and controversy among restaurant practitioners. Many 
industry experts are showing concerns as the bill would require employers to offer health 
benefits to part-time employees or pay a penalty (Frumkin, 2009). It has been reported that 91% 
of the foodservice industry is made up of small businesses with fewer than 50 employees and 
many part-time workers (NRA, 2009). Given the persistent economic weakness and substantial 
number of part-time restaurant employees, the bill is expected to place unforeseen hardships on 
the overall restaurant industry (Frumkin, 2009). Fitch Ratings (2009) anticipate more bankruptcy 
filings in upcoming years from highly leveraged restaurant chains and smaller independent 
restaurants.  
 
The recession has hampered restaurant sales and profits since 2008. The tough market 
conditions are expected to continue and the U.S. restaurant industry is likely to have difficult 
years ahead. What should restaurant firms do to deal with this lingering recession? To come up 
with answers to the question, one must first carefully examine the impact of the current recession 
on the restaurant industry. Solutions should be based on a thorough assessment of the financial 
damages that have been inflicted on the industry. This study attempts to come up with such an 
assessment by comparing the financial performance of the industry before and during the 
recession. The primary purpose of this study is to identify areas that have been significantly 
weakened by the recession in the industry by examining some key financial ratios. Based on 
identified weaknesses, policies and strategies to cope with the recession will be proposed. To the 
best of our knowledge, there is no study that has specifically examined the impact of the current 
recession on the financial performance of the restaurant industry. The findings of our study will 
not only help restaurant operators better understand the impact of current recession on the 
industry but also provide them with some clues to successfully tide over the recession.  
 
 
The Impact of Economic Downturns on the Hospitality Industries 
 
The effects of economic recessions on business have been well documented. According 
to Mascarenhas and Aaker (1989), recession is one of the most significant exogenous events that 
threatens a firm’s viability and continued profitability. Recession affects firms in almost all 
economic sectors, straining their cash flows and profit margin. This is because during periods of 
recession consumers spend less, unemployment rates soar, credit becomes less available, and 
competition intensifies, leading to the overall decline in economic activity (Pearce & Michael, 
2006). Prospects of survival are often dubious for firms affected by recession. It has been 
reported that more than 500,000 companies have filed for bankruptcy in the U.S. during each of 
the recessions that have occurred since 1990 (Pearce & Michael, 2006).  
  
 The hospitality industries are typically vulnerable to economic recessions because they 
derive revenues mostly from people’s discretionary consumptions. Discretionary consumptions 
are more affected by income levels and are thus more sensitive to economic conditions. During 
economic downturns, reduced income forces consumers to first cut back on their discretionary 
consumptions and hospitality operations are often the easy victims. The negative impacts of 
economic recession on hospitality firms have been well documented. For example, during the 
1990-1991 economic recession, the hotel room occupancy in the U.S. was well below the 
breakeven level and two-thirds of the lodging firms in the U.S. went bankrupt (Romeo, 1997). It 
has been reported that during a slow economy fewer people travel or stay at upscale properties 
(Bodamer, 2002). The 2001 recession that began in March and lasted for eight months placed 
hardships on some of the well-known U.S. lodging properties (Hotel & Motel Management, 
2001). In 2001, Wyndham International had to lay off 3% of its total workforce while Park Place 
Entertainment Corporation reduced the workforce at its Las Vegas Hilton property by 7% 
(Hotel & Motel Management, 2001). The most recent recession that began in December 2007 
has already taken its toll on many hospitality firms. According to Smith Travel Research, 
domestic hotel occupancy in September 2008 was 5% lower than that of the previous September 
(Sharkey, 2008). Even the upscale four- and five-star properties that appeared immune to 
previous recessions are now suffering due to decreasing corporate travel and rising cancellations 
(Sharkey, 2008).  
  
 The restaurant industry is also vulnerable to recession. The terrorist attacks and an 
economic downturn that intensified the 2001 recession led to sluggish same-store-sales growth 
and declining profit margins especially for the quick service restaurants (Nation's Restaurant 
News, 2002). Adjusted for inflation, the financial performance of the overall restaurant industry 
in 2001 was the fifth-lowest since 1970 (Papiernik, 2002). While the current recession caused 
most damage to the full-service and family dining segments, fast-food chains also suffered due to 
the increase in the nation’s unemployment rates (Edwards, 2009). These fast-food chains rely 
heavily on breakfast and lunch sales, and as more people lose their jobs, the demand for these 
meals fell sharply (Edwards, 2009). Since January 2008, six publicly traded restaurant 
companies have filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, namely Buffet Holdings Inc., VICORP 
Restaurants, Inc., Steakhouse Partners, Inc., Shoe Pavilion, Inc., Shells Seafood Restaurants, Inc., 
and most recently Uno Restaurant Holdings Corporation.  
 
 The impact of recession on the casino industry has also been severe. Back in 1991 when 
the nation was going through a recession triggered by a credit crisis and the war in the Middle 
East, gaming revenues in Nevada suffered their steepest-ever one-month drop in the state's 60 
years of legalized gambling (Reinhold, 1992). By the end of the same year, two large Las Vegas 
casino operators – Main Street Station and Riviera – declared bankruptcy (Reinhold, 1992). The 
2001 recession paired with the September 11 terrorist attack forced $1.4 billion Aladdin hotel-
casino out of business (Goldman, 2003). Aladdin was the third casino on the Las Vegas Strip that 
filed for bankruptcy protection in two decades (Goldman, 2003). Traditionally, the economy in 
Las Vegas has been heavily dependent on tourism and as a result it has been deeply affected by 
the economic downturn. The current deep global recession has taken its toll on some of the 
biggest casino operations in Las Vegas. Trump Entertainment Resorts, Inc. filed for bankruptcy 
protection for the third time in February 2009. Four months later, the Fontainebleau Las Vegas 
and two of its affiliates have filed for bankruptcy protection, shutting down a $3 billion 
development project (Audi, 2009). Station Casinos Inc. also filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 
July 2009 (Green, 2009). Sharp decreases in sales and passenger traffic are also observed in the 
airline industry. As of September 2008, the top seven U.S. airlines witnessed on average, a 
9.47% drop in domestic passenger miles traveled and carried 9.2% fewer passengers compared 
to September 2007 (Sharkey, 2008). It is obvious that almost all sectors of the hospitality and 
tourism industry are heavily affected by the current recession and for many firms, the likelihood 
of survival is questionable.  
 
Back in the 1990s, Gu (1996) compared financial ratios of four types of restaurant 
operations (upper scale restaurants, family restaurants, economy/buffet, and fast food 
restaurants). In that study, a firm’s financial performance was measured before and after the 
1989-1991 recession to investigate how the financial ratios of four different sectors changed in 
the post-recession period. Ten financial ratios measuring liquidity (current ratio, acid test ratio, 
operating cash flow to current liability), solvency (debt to equity, long-term debt to total 
capitalization, operating cash flow to total liability), profitability (net profit margin, return on 
assets, return on common equity), and efficiency (total assets turnover) of restaurant firms were 
employed. The findings suggest that the use of long-term debt, measured by long-term debt to 
total capitalization ratio, had a significant impact on firms’ post-recession performance. A firm’s 
higher reliance on long-term debt increased the amount of interest payment it had to pay and as a 
result deteriorated its liquidity and profitability. As a firm’s use of long-term debt decreased, its 
liquidity and profitability generally improved. 
 
More recently, Flouris and Walker (2005) assessed the impact of the September 11 
terrorist attack on the accounting performance of three major U.S. airlines, namely Southwest, 
Continental, and Northwest. To be more specific, the study attempted to analyze the relative 
accounting performance of a low-cost airline (Southwest) to that of full-service airlines 
(Continental and Northwest) in the aftermath of the 9/11 attack. All three airlines were profitable 
in 2000 and the first half of 2001, prior to the 9/11 attack. The study employed seven financial 
ratios – current ratio, asset turnover, debt ratio, interest coverage, net profit margin, return on 
assets, and return on equity – to  measure liquidity, activity, financing, and profitability of the 
sample firm’s operation. Findings of the study indicate that while the ratios of all three firms 
deteriorated after the attack, the ratios of Southwest fared better than those of the others. For 
Southwest, the declines in the ratios (i.e. current ratio, asset turnover, and interest coverage) were 
not as tremendous as they were for Continental or Northwest. The study concluded that low-cost 
carriers like Southwest are more likely to emerge from the crisis in a stronger market position 
due to their higher financial and operational flexibility. The airline’s more variable cost structure, 
lower operating expenses, and lower breakeven point all contribute towards its financial and 
operational flexibility. 
 
While many believe that hospitality firms are extremely vulnerable to the external 
financial crisis and economic swings, the literature addressing the impact of the current financial 
crisis on hospitality firms is very limited. This study attempts to fill this gap by investigating the 
financial performance of different restaurant sectors before and during the recession. By 
analyzing the reasons for their performance variances and the extent to which each sector has 
been affected, this study will propose strategies that restaurant operators may take to mitigate the 
damage of the current recession.  
 
Ratios Examined, Sample Firms and Data Periods 
 
  Altman (1983) has pointed out that financial ratios are gaining their importance and 
popularity as simple summary measurements of complicated financial relationships. Without the 
use of ratio analysis, it would be difficult to identify these critical relationships. According to 
Dopson and Hayes (2009), ratio analysis is most useful when a firm compares its actual 
performance to a previous time period, industry averages, or planned goals. In particular, Keown 
et al. (2006) posit that ratios allow the users to make meaningful comparisons of a firm’s data 
across time to compare the firm’s current and past performance and thereby identify underlying 
changes and trends (Keown et al., 2006). To identify the changes in the financial performance 
and conditions of the restaurant industry as a result of the recent economic downturn, this study 
compares the ratios of restaurant firms in 2006, the year prior to the recent economic recession, 
to those of restaurant firms in 2008, the year during which the economy experienced the full 
impact of the recession. Many studies report that within the restaurant industry, characteristics 
pertaining to each restaurant sector are likely to be different due to each sector’s different 
operating and financing characteristics (Kim & Gu, 2003). In their study on risk-adjusted 
performance of U.S. restaurants, Kim and Gu (2003) divided the sample restaurant firms into 
three groups based on their types of operation: (a) full-service restaurants, (b) economy/buffet 
restaurants, and (c) fast-food restaurants. Based on the classification criteria set up by Kim and 
Gu (2003), this study divided the sample restaurant firms into a full-service sector (29 firms), an 
economy/buffet sector (7 firms), and a fast-food sector (27 firms) as listed in Table 1. Each 
sector is analyzed separately to provide more relevant outcomes.  
 
(Table 1: A List of Sample Restaurant Firms Selected for Each Sector) 
 
  To determine the overall impact of the recent recession on the restaurant industry, all the 
five groups of financial ratios categorized by Singh & Schmidgall (2001) were examined, 
including liquidity, leverage, solvency, efficiency, and profitability ratios. According to Singh 
and Schmidgall (2001) and Dopson and Hayes (2009), liquidity ratios address the ability of a 
firm to pay its short-term obligations on time. Leverage ratios indicate the extent to which a 
company is relying upon debt financing while solvency ratios help managers assess a firm’s 
ability to use operation generated earnings and cash flows to cover its debts and interest expenses. 
On the other hand, efficiency ratios evaluate the productivity of a firm for a given level of inputs. 
They assess a firm’s ability to effectively use the firm’s assets to generate sales. Profitability 
ratios measure the management’s ability in generating profits for the firm. Fourteen ratios across 
these five categories that have been widely used in previous ratio analysis studies for restaurant 
firms (Gu, 1996; Kim & Gu, 2006) were selected for the cross-time comparative analysis in this 
study. Those ratios and their derivation formulas are presented in Table 2. 
 
(Table 2: Summary of Financial Ratios)  
 
  All firms with a Standardized Industrial Classification (SIC) code of 5812, which 
represents “Eating Places” or restaurant firms, and had financial statements available for 2006 
and 2008 were searched from the Standard and Poor's COMPUSTAT database. The search came 
back with 63 companies which composed the sample. From the financial statements of these 
restaurant firms in 2006 and 2008, the 14 financial ratios as listed in Table 2 were computed for 
each firm for the two years. According to the National Bureau of Economic Research, the U.S. 
economy officially sank into a recession in December 2007 (Andrews, 2008). Therefore, the 
2007 ratios were not used for comparison in our study because they would reflect only the partial 
impact of the recession on the industry. While the ratios of 2006 can best represent the status of 
the industry in the year just before the recent recession, the ratios of 2008 can reflect the position 
of the industry in a year when the recession was in full swing.  
 
Findings for the Full Service Sector 
 
  The mean value of each of the 14 ratios was calculated for the U.S. restaurant firms based 
on the 2006 and 2008 data. Paired sample t-tests were then employed to test the difference 
between the group means of each ratio for each sector. Table 3 summarizes the group means of 
the 14 financial ratios for the full service sector. The t-test statistics and related significance 
levels are also reported.  
 
(Table 3: Summary of Ratio Statistics of Full Service Restaurant Firms)  
  
 Based on the results of the paired sample t-tests, the two groups were significantly 
different in six ratios at the 0.01 level – debt ratio, long-term debt to total capitalization (LTD to 
TC), earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA)  to total liabilities 
(TL), interest coverage ratio, profit margin, and return on assets (ROA). At the 0.05 level, two 
more ratios became significant, namely current ratio and inventory turnover ratio. Quick ratio, 
EBITDA to current liabilities (CL) and return on equity (ROE) also turned out to be significant 
at the 0.10 level indicating that among the 14 ratios employed in this study, ten of them changed 
significantly over the two-year timeframe. For these full service restaurant firms, the ratios in 
2008 showed considerable deterioration in all five areas of firm performance indicating the 
severe negative impact of the current recession on these firms.   
 
 Debt ratio and interest coverage ratio appeared to have changed the most. Debt ratio 
measures a firm’s leverage status indicating the extent to which the firm is relying on borrowed 
funds. On a similar note, LTD to TC assesses a firm’s use of long-term debt relative to its total 
capitalization. Prior to the recession, an average restaurant firm’s debt ratio was 0.35 indicating 
that on average, U.S. full service restaurant firms were financed by 35 percent of debt and 65 
percent of equity. The ratio almost doubled in 2008, indicating a firm’s significantly higher use 
of debt financing. In 2008, these restaurant firms were twice more indebted than they were two 
years ago. At the 0.01 level, the reliance of an average restaurant firm on long-term debt has 
significantly increased as well. The increase in debt ratio was more significant than the increase 
in LTD to TC, suggesting an even greater increase in short-term liabilities, consistent with the 
significantly lowered current ratio. During the recession, firms may have borrowed more, for 
both short-term and long-term debts. As a solvency ratio, the interest coverage ratio measures a 
company’s ability to pay interest on its outstanding debt. The significantly lower interest 
coverage ratio observed in 2008 indicates that many firms struggled in making their scheduled 
interest payment probably due to higher interest expenses resulting from increased borrowing 
and lower profitability.  
 
 In 2008, all three profitability ratios of the sector turned negative implying that an 
average full service restaurant in the U.S. experienced net loss during the year. According to 
Singh and Schmidgall (2001), solvency ratios provide information about a company’s ability to 
withstand operating losses. As shown in Table 3, both solvency ratios were significantly lower in 
2008. The coverage provided by operating income and cash flow to debts and interests was 
significantly reduced. The deterioration may well be a result of (1) lower sales, which led to 
lower operating income and cash flow; and (2) more borrowing due to greater amount of TL and 
interest expenses. The dramatic decrease in these ratios indicates that these full service restaurant 
firms may not be able to endure operating losses for extended period of time. It is imperative that 
these firms revise their current financing policies and reduce the amount of loss they are carrying 
as otherwise they may not survive through the recession. 
 
Findings for the Economy/Buffet Sector 
 
 The group means of the 14 financial ratios for the economy/buffet restaurants and their 
paired sample t-test statistic results are summarized in Table 4.   
 
(Table 4: Summary of Ratio Statistics of Economy/ Buffet Restaurant Firms)  
 
 The economy/buffet sector seems to have the least significant changes in their ratios, 
suggesting that they may have fared better than other sectors during the current recession. 
However, the limited sample size of this group could have made it difficult to observe significant 
differences between the ratios. Only two ratios were found to be significant at the 0.10 level, 
namely EBITDA to CL and debt ratio. EBITDA to CL is a liquidity ratio that examines a firm’s 
ability to pay its short-term obligations using operating cash flows. The ability of a firm in using 
its operation generated cash flow to cover CL was weakened as indicated by EBITDA to CL in 
2008. The debt ratio assesses the proportion of a firm’s assets that are financed through debts. 
Much higher debt ratio in 2008 indicates significantly higher debt financing used by firms 
compared to 2006. The significant increase in debt ratio, combined with the insignificant change 
in LTD to TC ratio, suggests that debt increase in this sector was mainly caused by an increase in 
short-term liabilities and this may have lead to the deteriorated EBITDA to CL ratio. Though less 
affected by the recession, the economy/buffet restaurant firms need to be watchful of their rising 
current liabilities and keep this ratio from deteriorating further. 
Findings for the Fast-Food Sector 
 
  Table 5 reports the group means of the 14 financial ratios for the fast-food sector. The 
paired t-test statistics and related significance levels are also presented. While fewer significant 
changes in ratios were observed in this group than in the full service restaurants, this sector had 
more ratios showing significant deterioration than the economy/buffet sector. 
 
(Table 5: Summary of Ratio Statistics of Fast-Food Restaurant Firms)  
 
  The debt ratio was significantly different at the 0.01 level. Changes in EBITDA to TL, 
inventory turnover, and ROA were all significant at the 0.05 level. When tested on the 0.10 
significance level, EBITDA to CL and ROE also turned out to be significant. In summary, 
among the 14 ratios examined for fast-food industry, seven of them changed significantly over 
the two years.  
 
 The comparison of the two groups’ mean debt ratio shows that in 2008 firms were twice 
more indebted than they were two years ago. On average, these firms were financed by 80% of 
debt and 20% of equity. Back in 2006, they had much healthier financial structure with only 42% 
of debt financing. According to Schwei (1996), debt ratio exceeding 0.50 is troublesome as 
higher debt ratio usually leaves the company with smaller margins for error through tighter loan 
covenants and higher interest rates. Excessive use of debt financing increases the company’s 
interest expenses and further decreases the profitability of the operation. EBITDA to CL and 
EBITDA to TL are ratios that demonstrate the extent to which operating earnings can be used to 
cover short-term and long-term debt, respectively. As indicated in Table 5, U.S. fast-food 
restaurant firms were worse positioned in 2008 in both aspects.  
 
 For the efficiency ratios of this group, both accounts receivable (AR) turnover and 
inventory turnover decreased in 2008 at least at the 0.10 level. Fast-food restaurant firms in 2006 
had AR turnover at 61.8 and the ratio slowed down to 47.6 in 2008, indicating much slower 
collection of sales money. This could be due to clients’ weakened ability to pay on time and 
restaurants’ more lenient credit policy in an attempt to increase sales. On the other hand, 
inventory turnover assesses the efficiency of a firm in using the invested resources (Schwei, 
1996). Higher inventory turnover indicates more efficient use of inventories. The fast-food 
restaurant companies had considerably lower inventory turnover in 2008, suggesting that either 
they were selling inventories much slower or they were carrying more excessive amount of 
inventory than they were two years ago (Youn & Gu, 2009). Significantly lower inventory 
turnover in 2008 indicates slowed sales not accompanied by proportionately lowered inventory 
carrying which may be a sign of inefficient inventory management. Both total assets turnover 
and fixed assets turnover ratios increased in 2008, though not significantly, probably due to 
slowed or suspended expansion activities during the recession. Obviously in 2008 lower sales 
were accompanied by shrinking assets, especially fixed assets, thus leading to insignificant 
change in the efficiency of total assets and fixed assets. For this group, asset efficiency problem 
seems to exist in their AR turnover and inventory turnover.  
 
The ROA ratio measures the amount of net income generated from each dollar invested 
in the firm’s assets while the ROE ratio assesses the amount of return to the investment made by 
the investors. Both ratios were significantly lower in 2008. In 2006, an average fast-food 
restaurant firm was able to generate $0.06 for every dollar invested in assets and $0.14 for every 
dollar invested by the owners. Two years later, these restaurant firms on average generated a 
negative return on the assets and brought a loss to their investors.  
 
 In summary, deteriorations in ratios of restaurant firms over time are noticeable. All three 
sectors of U.S. restaurant firms were worse positioned in 2008 in all five dimensions, namely 
liquidity, leverage, solvency, efficiency, and profitability, with most significant ratio 
deteriorations observed in the full service sector, followed by the fast-food group and the 
economy/buffet restaurants. 
 
 Conclusions and Suggestions 
 
 This study investigated the impact of the current recession on U.S. restaurant firms by 
comparing 14 financial ratios in 2006, the pre-recession year, with the same ratios in 2008, the 
during-recession year, to assess different aspects of restaurant firms’ financial performance and 
conditions. The findings indicate that all three sectors of the restaurant industry, namely full 
service, economy/buffet, and fast-food sectors, have been negatively affected by the recession. 
Full service restaurants, however, were found to have suffered more than the other two sectors. 
Full service restaurants sell meals with menu prices higher than those in the other two sectors. 
The current financial crisis and economic recession have caused higher unemployment rate and 
lower disposable income, thus making consumers more sensitive to higher priced full service 
restaurant menus and greatly weakening this sector’s sales and financial performance. On the 
other hand, the economy/buffet and fast-food restaurants have fared better than full service 
restaurants. Their relatively more affordable menu prices may have made consumers less 
sensitive to the recession-caused income effect and hence their less affected conditions in the 
economy recession. While the small sample size of the economy/buffet restaurants may make the 
findings for this group less reliable, the limited sample size of this group itself may suggest that 
there are not too many economy/buffet restaurant firms competing with each other in the sector 
which may be the reason why they outperformed the other two sectors. The underperformance of 
the fast food sector in contrast to the economy/buffet sector may well be due to the intense 
competition among numerous fast food restaurants in the sector. Our findings are also in line 
with Gu’s earlier study (1996) reporting that fast-food operations are more recession-resistant 
whereas full service restaurants are more vulnerable to financial crisis. This is because the 
products of fast-food operations are considered as necessities while the products of full service 
restaurants are viewed as luxuries (Gu, 1996). Elan (2009) predicts that among all of the dining 
segments, fast-food is expected to outperform all of the others in upcoming years.  
 
 The findings of this study carry important managerial implications for the U.S. restaurant 
industry. While changes were observed in numerous ratios within each restaurant sector, two 
ratios – EBITDA to CL and debt ratio – were significant for all three sectors of restaurant firms. 
Debt ratio almost doubled over the two-year period for all three groups. It is well known that 
carrying excessive debt leads to higher risk for the company due to heavy interest expenses and 
principal repayment burden. When the economy is booming and sales are high, debt financing 
can further increase the return to the owner because the interest cost is fixed (Youn & Gu, 2007). 
However, when the economy is in recession and sales are sluggish, the fixed interest payment 
will further press down the net income and possibly even make it negative. In a situation like this, 
it is recommended that U.S. restaurant firms take urgent measures to avoid getting further 
indebted and adopt a conservative financing policy. Gu (1993) proposed issuing new equity as a 
means to obtain additional capital, rather than issuing bonds or borrowing from financial 
institutions. U.S. restaurant firms may take advantage of the current recovery of the stock market 
and raise additional equity to help improve their liquidity, leverage and solvency ratios.  
 
 The significant drop in EBITDA to CL ratio observed in all three restaurant sectors 
indicates the pressure on restaurant firms’ EBITDA or operating cash flow during the recession. 
The deterioration of EBITDA was noticeable across all the three sectors. For the economic/buffet 
sector, there are no significant changes in other ratios that may provide clues to explain this 
deterioration and thus it may simply be a result of the slowdown of the dining market during this 
recession. For the full service sector, on the other hand, the sharp decline in inventory turnover 
could be a major contributor to the significant deterioration in EBITDA. Inventory turnover ratio, 
which is computed by dividing the cost of food sold during a period by the average inventory on 
hand during the same period, determines an operation’s efficiency by measuring how long food 
remains in inventory (Reynolds, 1999). Analyzing this ratio is important as the way a firm 
manages its inventory has a direct impact on its profitability. While there is no ideal minimum or 
maximum turnover ratio, lower ratio, which may indicate excess inventory, can result in 
inordinate waste, increased labor costs and storage costs, spoilage, and theft (Farsad & LeBruto, 
1993; Reynolds, 1999). U.S. full service restaurant firms may need to adopt some advanced 
inventory management models to improve inventory turnover. According to Reynolds (1999), 
there are practices that firms may use to optimize the inventory management. These practices 
include limiting the number of suppliers, standardizing and rotating stock, and periodically 
conducting physical inventory valuation.     
 
 For the fast-food restaurant firms, both AR and inventory turnover show considerable 
deterioration and they may have caused the significant drop in EBITDA to CL ratio. A firm’s 
inventory level and credit policy have direct impact on the volume of sales and profit as lenient 
credit policy is likely to increase sales while an efficient control of inventory is required to 
maximize profit (Mehar, 2005). During recessions, firms usually face liquidity problem as it is 
more difficult to collect outstanding receivables (Page, 1980). In addition, many firms carry 
excess inventories at the beginning of a recession (Mehar, 2005). The excess inventory paired 
with decreased sales often lead to lower inventory turnover. It is recommended that U.S. fast-
food restaurant firms speed up the AR turnover while raising their inventory turnover ratios. 
They should re-examine their current credit policy and optimize the inventory size to improve 
the operating efficiency of these two assets. While faster AR turnover could help lower bad debt 
expenses and improve liquidity, higher inventory turnover may help lower cost of food sold, thus 
lower the operating costs and increase the profitability, especially the EBITDA.    
 
 In summary, the findings of this study indicate that U.S. restaurant firms have suffered 
severe negative impacts from the recession in terms of liquidity, leverage, solvency, efficiency, 
and profitability. In particular, restaurant firms need to strengthen their coverage to liabilities 
provided by EBITDA or operating cash flow, speed up their inventory turnover and accounts 
receivable turnover and lower their indebtedness. To cope with the current recession, first of all, 
restaurant firms need to make efforts to raise their sales and EBITDA. Although the negative 
impact of the recession on sales and EBITDA is inevitable, restaurant firms could do something 
to minimize the impact. For example, a recent survey by NRA (2009) found that 75% of full 
service restaurant customers and 60% of fast-food customers would eat out more frequently if 
they could get discounts for dining on less busy days of the week. Restaurant firms may consider 
giving more ‘happy hour’ promotions for dining on weekdays or in early hours to increase their 
sales. During a recession time, consumers may be more sensitive to prices due to the recession’s 
income effect. Giving discounts could be a more effective way to stimulate sales during the 
recession than in normal economic times. Fitch ratings (2009) also report that offering great 
values together with high quality food and service will remain a key priority for the industry. 
Secondly, restaurant firms should manage their inventories in a more scientific and efficient way. 
Thirdly, restaurants should not overly use lenient credit policy to stimulate sales as it is likely to 
carry a much higher bad-debt risk during a recession. Sales promotion should be based on smart 
discounting with sustained improvement in market share, rather than loose credit policy (Fitch 
ratings, 2009). Finally, restaurant firms could capitalize on the recovery of the stock market to 
raise more equity in order to reduce their indebtedness. Raising sales and EBITDA, improving 
the efficiency of their accounts receivable and inventory and reducing indebtedness are critical 
steps for U.S. restaurant firms to take to survive through the current recession.  
 
 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
 
 This study empirically examined the impact of the current recession on U.S. restaurant 
firms using only secondary data and financial ratio analysis. Restaurant managers’ assessment of 
the recession impact is not reflected in our study. Future studies may use a questionnaire to 
survey restaurant managers directly to validate the findings obtained by this study. Another 
major limitation of this study is that it only utilized one-year’s worth of data to assess the firms’ 
financial performance before and during the recession, respectively. While the majority of 
economists believe that the U.S. recession is finally over, the National Bureau of Economic 
Research has yet to announce an official end to the current recession (Quinn, 2010). Many 
experts expect the recovery to be slow and halting, which will leave many people and firms 
feeling the effects of the downturn in upcoming years (Isidore, 2009). According to Pearce and 
Michael (2006), some companies emerge from a recession stronger and more highly valued than 
others. As such, future research investigating the impact of economic recession on restaurant 
firms may study the firms’ financial conditions and performances during two periods, pre-
recession and post-recession, and identify the ‘survivors.’ Financial and operational 
characteristics pertaining to these ‘survivors’ should help restaurant operators revise their current 
business policies and strategies. 
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Table 1 
A List of Sample Restaurant Firms Selected for Each Sector 
 
Full-Service Restaurants (29 firms) Economy/ Buffet Restaurants (7 firms) Fast-Food Restaurants (27 firms) 
Ark Restaurants Corp. Buffets Holdings, Inc. AFC Enterprises, Inc. 
Benihana Inc -Cl A Denny's Corp. Brazil Fast Food Corp. 
BJ's Restaurants, Inc.  Luby's Inc. Burger King Holdings, Inc. 
Bob Evans Farms NPC Iinternational, Inc. Caribou Coffee Co. 
Brinker Intl, Inc. Panera Bread Co. CEC  Entertainment, Inc. 
Buffalo Wild Wings, Inc.  Star Buffet, Inc. Carrol's Corp. 
California Pizza Kitchen, Inc. Western Sizzlin Corp. CKE Restaurants, Inc. 
CBRL Group, Inc.  Diedrich Coffee, Inc. 
Cheesecake Factory, Inc.  Domino's Pizza, Inc. 
Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc.   Einstein Noah Restaurant Grp 
Cosi Inc.  Good Times Restaurants, Inc. 
Cracker Barrel Old Ctry Stor  Jack In The Box, Inc. 
Darden Restaurants, Inc.  Jamba, Inc. 
Dineequity, Inc.  McDonald's Corp. 
Eat At Joe's Ltd.   Morgans Foods, Inc. 
Famous Daves Of America, Inc.  MTY Food Group, Inc. 
Flanigans Enterprises, Inc.  Nathan's Famous Inc. 
Granite City Food & Brewery   Papa Johns International, Inc. 
J. Alexander's Corp.  Priszm Corp. 
Kona Grill, Inc.   Red Robin Gourmet Burgers 
Landry's Restaurants, Inc.  Rubio's Restaurants, Inc. 
Mccormick & Schmicks Seafood  Sonic Corp. 
Mexican Restaurants, Inc.  Starbucks Corp. 
Morton's Restaurant Group, Inc.  Steak N Shake Co. 
O'Charley's, Inc.  Tim Hortons, Inc. 
Perkins & Marie Callenders  Wendy's/Arby's Group, Inc. 
P F Chang's China Bistro, Inc.  Yum Brands, Inc. 
Ruth's Chris Steak House   
Texas Roadhouse, Inc.     
Table 2 
Summary of Financial Ratios  
 
Category Ratio Formula 
Liquidity Current ratio (CR) Current assets / Current liabilities 
 Quick ratio (QR) (Current assets – inventories – prepaid 
expenses) / Current liabilities  
 Earnings before interest, tax, 
depreciation and amortization 
(EBITDA) to current liabilities (CL) 
 
EBITDA / Current liabilities 
Debt ratio Total liabilities / Total assets Leverage 
Long term debt to total 
capitalization ratio (LTD to TC) 
 
Long term debt/ (Long term debt + Total 
stockholder’s equity) 
 
Solvency Earnings before interest, tax, 
depreciation and amortization 
(EBITDA) to total liabilities (TL) 
 
EBITDA / Total liabilities  
 Interest coverage ratio EBIT / Interest expense 
 
Efficiency Accounts receivable (AR) turnover Total revenues/ Average accounts 
receivable 
 Inventory turnover Cost of goods sold / Average inventories 
 Fixed assets (FA) turnover Total revenues / Average fixed assets  
 Total assets (TA) turnover 
 
Total revenues / Average total assets 
Profit margin (PM) Net income / Total revenues 
Return on assets (ROA) Net income / Total assets 
Profitability 
Return on equity (ROE) Net income / Equity 
 
Table 3 
Summary of Ratio Statistics for Full Service Restaurant Firms  
 
Ratios Average in 2008 
Average in 
2006 t-value Sig. 
Liquidity     
CR (n=29) 0.8196 1.1079 -2.7420 .0110** 
QR (n=29) 0.6316 0.8296 -1.8780 .0710* 
EBITDA to CL (n=29) 0.7046 0.8039 -1.7640 .0890* 
     
Leverage     
Debt Ratio (n=29) 0.6910 0.3478 11.9000 .0000*** 
LTD to TC (n=28) 0.2748 0.1793 5.1900 .0000*** 
     
Solvency     
EBITDA to TL (n=29) 0.2573 0.3570 -3.6970 .0010*** 
Interest coverage (n=29) 1.9065 6.0650 -3.1410 .0050*** 
     
Efficiency     
AR turnover (n=27) 83.9270 92.7317 -0.4880 .6300 
Inventory turnover (n=29) 71.6862 103.2455   -2.4410 .0220** 
FA turnover (n=29) 3.6800 2.7881 0.8780 .3880 
TA turnover (n=29) 1.6105 1.5392 1.1460 .2610 
     
Profitability     
Profit Margin (n=29) -0.0528 0.0135 -4.0550 .0000*** 
Return on Assets (n=29) -0.0702 0.0239 -4.6200 .0000*** 
Return on Equity (n=29) -0.2948 0.0905 -1.7950 .0830* 
Note. * indicates p < 0.1, ** indicates p < 0.05, *** indicates p < 0.01 
Table 4 
Summary of Ratio Statistics for Economy/ Buffet Restaurant Firms  
 
Ratios Average in 2008 
Average in 
2006 t-value Sig. 
Liquidity     
CR (n=7) 0.8202 0.9801 -0.9440 .3820 
QR (n=7) 0.7162 0.7686 -0.4310 .6810 
EBITDA to CL (n=7) 0.7308 1.0408 -2.2290 .0670* 
     
Leverage     
Debt Ratio (n=7) 0.8355 0.4555 2.1440 .0760* 
LTD to TC (n=7) 0.2651 0.3743 -0.8600 .4230 
     
Solvency     
EBITDA to TL (n=7) 0.3184 0.4433 -1.5930 .1620 
Interest Coverage (n=7) 9.3043 11.4500 -0.2460 .8140 
     
Efficiency     
AR turnover (n=7) 76.0655 136.9670 -1.4310 .2020 
Inventory turnover (n=7) 112.3906 125.5121 -1.1910 .2790 
FA turnover (n=7) 1.9757 2.3049 -1.3790 .2170 
TA turnover (n=7) 1.7058 1.5134 1.0360 .3400 
     
Profitability     
Profit Margin (n=7) -0.0909 0.0258 -1.8840 .1090 
Return on Assets (n=7) -0.1340 0.0420 -1.4160 .2070 
Return on Equity (n=7) 0.0557 0.0320 0.1970 .8500 
Note. * indicates p < 0.1, ** indicates p < 0.05, *** indicates p < 0.01 
Table 5 
Summary of Ratio Statistics for Fast-Food Restaurant Firms  
 
Ratios Average in 2008 
Average in 
2006 t-value Sig. 
Liquidity     
CR (n=27) 1.0891 1.1086 -0.1680 .8680 
QR (n=27) 0.9423 0.8532 0.7660 .4510 
EBITDA to CL (n=27) 0.8666 1.0038 -2.0310 .0530* 
     
Leverage     
Debt Ratio (n=27) 0.8030 0.4209 4.1990 .0000*** 
LTD to TC (n=27) 0.4444 0.3603 0.9710 .3400 
     
Solvency     
EBITDA to TL (n=27) 0.2648 0.3339 -2.1750 .0390** 
Interest Coverage (n=23) 0.6548 4.2309 -1.5830 .1280 
     
Efficiency     
AR turnover (n=27) 47.5840 61.7790 -1.8090 .0820* 
Inventory turnover (n=27) 63.6306 85.0851 -2.5200 .0180** 
FA turnover (n=27) 3.4093 3.2263 0.2530 .8020 
TA turnover (n=27) 1.6707 1.5661 0.9120 .3700 
     
Profitability     
Profit Margin (n=27) 0.0077 -0.0393 0.5820 .5660 
Return on Assets (n=27) -0.0207 0.0627 -2.2160 .0360** 
Return on Equity (n=27) -0.6056 0.1447 -1.9010 .0680* 
Note. * indicates p < 0.1, ** indicates p < 0.05, *** indicates p < 0.01 
 
 
 
